This paper examines whether the Solow growth model is consistent with the international variation in the standard of living. It shows that an augmented Solow model that includes accumulation of human as well as physical capital provides an excellent description of the cross-country data. The paper also examines the implications of the Solow model for convergence in standards of living, that is, for whether poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. The evidence indicates that, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge at about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts.
population growth, it does not correctly predict the magnitudes. In the data the effects of saving and population growth on income are too large. To understand the relation between saving, population growth, and income, one must go beyond the textbook Solow model.
We therefore augment the Solow model by including accumulation of human as well as physical capital. The exclusion of human capital from the textbook Solow model can potentially explain why the estimated influences of saving and population growth appear too large, for two reasons. First, for any given rate of humancapital accumulation, higher saving or lower population growth leads to a higher level of income and thus a higher level of human capital; hence, accumulation of physical capital and population growth have greater impacts on income when accumulation of human capital is taken into account. Second, human-capital accumulation may be correlated with saving rates and population growth rates; this would imply that omitting human-capital accumulation biases the estimated coefficients on saving and population growth.
To test the augmented Solow model, we include a proxy for human-capital accumulation as an additional explanatory variable in our cross-country regressions. We find that accumulation of human capital is in fact correlated with saving and population growth. Including human-capital accumulation lowers the estimated effects of saving and population growth to roughly the values predicted by the augmented Solow model. Moreover, the augmented model accounts for about 80 percent of the crosscountry variation in income. Given the inevitable imperfections in this sort of cross-country data, we consider the fit of this simple model to be remarkable. It appears that the augmented Solow model provides an almost complete explanation of why some countries are rich and other countries are poor.
After developing and testing the augmented Solow model, we examine an issue that has received much attention in recent years: the failure of countries to converge in per capita income. We argue that one should not expect convergence. Rather, the Solow model predicts that countries generally reach different steady states. We examine empirically the set of countries for which nonconvergence has been widely documented in past work. We find that once differences in saving and population growth rates are accounted for, there is convergence at roughly the rate that the model predicts.
Finally, we discuss the predictions of the Solow model for international variation in rates of return and for capital movements. The model predicts that poor countries should tend to have higher rates of return to physical and human capital. We discuss various evidence that one might use to evaluate this prediction. In contrast to many recent authors, we interpret the available evidence on rates of return as generally consistent with the Solow model.
Overall, the findings reported in this paper cast doubt on the recent trend among economists to dismiss the Solow growth model in favor of endogenous-growth models that assume constant or increasing returns to scale in capital. One can explain much of the cross-country variation in income while maintaining the assumption of decreasing returns. This conclusion does not imply, however, that the Solow model is a complete theory of growth: one would like also to understand the determinants of saving, population growth, and worldwide technological change, all of which the Solow model treats as exogenous. Nor does it imply that endogenousgrowth models are not important, for they may provide the right explanation of worldwide technological change. Our conclusion does imply, however, that the Solow model gives the right answers to the questions it is designed to address.
I. THE TEXTBOOK SOLOW MODEL
We begin by briefly reviewing the Solow growth model. We focus on the model's implications for cross-country data.
A. The Model
Solow's model takes the rates of saving, population growth, and technological progress as exogenous. There are two inputs, capital and labor, which are paid their marginal products. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, so production at time t is given by The steady-state capital-labor ratio is related positively to the rate of saving and negatively to the rate of population growth. The central predictions of the Solow model concern the impact of saving and population growth on real income. Substituting (5) into the production function and taking logs, we find that steadystate income per capita is Because the model assumes that factors are paid their marginal products, it predicts not only the signs but also the magnitudes of the coefficients on saving and population growth. Specifically, because capital's share in income (a) is roughly one third, the model implies an elasticity of income per capita with respect to the saving rate of approximately 0.5 and an elasticity with respect to n + g + 8 of approximately -0.5.
B. Specification
The natural question to consider is whether the data support the Solow model's predictions concerning the determinants of standards of living. In other words, we want to investigate whether real income is higher in countries with higher saving rates and lower in countries with higher values of n + g + 5.
We assume that g and 8 are constant across countries. g reflects primarily the advancement of knowledge, which is not country-specific. And there is neither any strong reason to expect depreciation rates to vary greatly across countries, nor are there any data that would allow us to estimate country-specific depreciation rates. In contrast, the A(0) term reflects not just technology but resource endowments, climate, institutions, and so on; it may therefore differ across countries. We assume that lnA(O) = a + E, where a is a constant and E is a country-specific shock. Thus, log income per capita at a given time-time 0 for simplicity-is
In a+ In(s)-In(n+g+8)+E. Equation (7) is our basic empirical specification in this section. We assume that the rates of saving and population growth are independent of country-specific factors shifting the production function. That is, we assume that s and n are independent of e. This assumption implies that we can estimate equation (7) with ordinary least squares (OLS).1
There are three reasons for making this assumption of independence. First, this assumption is made not only in the Solow model, but also in many standard models of economic growth. In any model in which saving and population growth are endogenous but preferences are isoelastic, s and n are unaffected by E. In other words, under isoelastic utility, permanent differences in the level of technology do not affect saving rates or population growth rates.
Second, much recent theoretical work on growth has been motivated by informal examinations of the relationships between saving, population growth, and income. Many economists have asserted that the Solow model cannot account for the international differences in income, and this alleged failure of the Solow model has stimulated work on endogenous-growth theory. For example, Romer [1987 Romer [ , 1989a suggests that saving has too large an influence on growth and takes this to be evidence for positive externalities from capital accumulation. Similarly, Lucas [1988] asserts that variation in population growth cannot account for any substantial variation in real incomes along the lines predicted by the Solow model. By maintaining the identifying assumption that s and n are independent of E, we are able to determine whether systematic examination of the data confirms these informal judgments.
1. If s and n are endogenous and influenced by the level of income, then estimates of equation (7) using ordinary least squares are potentially inconsistent. In this case, to obtain consistent estimates, one needs to find instrumental variables that are correlated with s and n, but uncorrelated with the country-specific shift in the production function e. Finding such instrumental variables is a formidable task, however.
Third, because the model predicts not just the signs but also the magnitudes of the coefficients on saving and population growth, we can gauge whether there are important biases in the estimates obtained with OLS. As described above, data on factor shares imply that, if the model is correct, the elasticities of Y/L with respect to s and n + g + 8 are approximately 0.5 and -0.5. If OLS yields coefficients that are substantially different from these values, then we can reject the joint hypothesis that the Solow model and our identifying assumption are correct.
Another way to evaluate the Solow model would be to impose on equation (7) a value of ao derived from data on factor shares and then to ask how much of the cross-country variation in income the model can account for. That is, using an approach analogous to "growth accounting," we could compute the fraction of the variance in living standards that is explained by the mechanism identified by the Solow model.2 In practice, because we do not have exact estimates of factor shares, we do not emphasize this growthaccounting approach. Rather, we estimate equation (7) by OLS and examine the plausibility of the implied factor shares. The fit of this regression shows the result of a growth-accounting exercise performed with the estimated value of a. If the estimated a differs from the value obtained a priori from factor shares, we can compare the fit of the estimated regression with the fit obtained by imposing the a priori value.
C. Data and Samples
The data are from the Real National Accounts recently constructed by Summers and Heston [1988] . The data set includes real income, government and private consumption, investment, and population for almost all of the world other than the centrally planned economies. The data are annual and cover the period 1960-1985. We measure n as the average rate of growth of the working-age population, where working age is defined as 15 to 64.3 We measure s as the average share of real investment (including 2. In standard growth accounting, factor shares are used to decompose growth over time in a single country into a part explained by growth in factor inputs and an unexplained part-the Solow residual-which is usually attributed to technological change. In this cross-country analogue, factor shares are used to decompose variation in income across countries into a part explained by variation in saving and population growth rates and an unexplained part, which could be attributed to international differences in the level of technology. We consider three samples of countries. The most comprehensive consists of all countries for which data are available other than those for which oil production is the dominant industry.4 This sample consists of 98 countries. We exclude the oil producers because the bulk of recorded GDP for these countries represents the extraction of existing resources, not value added; one should not expect standard growth models to account for measured GDP in these countries.5
Our second sample excludes countries whose data receive a grade of "D" from Summers and Heston or whose populations in 1960 were less than one million. Summers and Heston use the "D" grade to identify countries whose real income figures are based on extremely little primary data; measurement error is likely to be a greater problem for these countries. We omit the small countries because the determination of their real income may be dominated by idiosyncratic factors. This sample consists of 75 countries.
The third sample consists of the 22 OECD countries with populations greater than one million. This sample has the advantages that the data appear to be uniformly of high quality and that the variation in omitted country-specific factors is likely to be small. But it has the disadvantages that it is small in size and that it discards much of the variation in the variables of interest.
See the Appendix for the countries in each of the samples and the data.
D. Results
We estimate equation (7) both with and without imposing the constraint that the coefficients on ln(s) and ln(n + g + 8) are equal in magnitude and opposite in sign. We assume that g + 8 is 0.05; reasonable changes in this assumption have little effect on the estimates.6 Table I reports the results.
4. For purposes of comparability, we restrict the sample to countries that have not only the data used in this section, but also the data on human capital described in Section II.
5. The countries that are excluded on this basis are Bahrain, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, Lesotho is excluded because the sum of private and government consumption far exceeds GDP in every year of the sample, indicating that labor income from abroad constitutes an extremely large fraction of GNP.
6. We chose this value of g + 8 to match the available data. In U. S. data the capital consumption allowance is about 10 percent of GNP, and the capital-output ratio is about three, which implies that 8 is about 0.03; Romer [1989a, p. 60] presents a calculation for a broader sample of countries and concludes that 8 is Three aspects of the results support the Solow model. First, the coefficients on saving and population growth have the predicted signs and, for two of the three samples, are highly significant. Second, the restriction that the coefficients on ln(s) and ln(n + g + 8) are equal in magnitude and opposite in sign is not rejected in any of the samples. Third, and perhaps most important, differences in saving and population growth account for a large fraction of the cross-country variation in income per capita. In the regression for the intermediate sample, for example, the adjusted R2 is 0.59. In contrast to the common claim that the Solow model "explains" cross-country variation in labor productivity largely by appealing to variations in technologies, the two readily observable about 0.03 or 0.04. In addition, growth in income per capita has averaged 1.7 percent per year in the United States and 2.2 percent per year in our intermediate sample; this suggests that g is about 0.02. variables on which the Solow model focuses in fact account for most of the variation in income per capita. Nonetheless, the model is not completely successful. In particular, the estimated impacts of saving and labor force growth are much larger than the model predicts. The value of a. implied by the coefficients should equal capital's share in income, which is roughly one third. The estimates, however, imply an a that is much higher. For example, the a implied by the coefficient in the constrained regression for the intermediate sample is 0.59 (with a standard error of 0.02). Thus, the data strongly contradict the prediction that a = 1/3.
Because the estimates imply such a high capital share, it is inappropriate to conclude that the Solow model is successful just because the regressions in Table I can explain a high fraction of the variation in income. For the intermediate sample, for instance, when we employ the "growth-accounting" approach described above and constrain the coefficients to be consistent with an a of one third, the adjusted R2 falls from 0.59 to 0.28. Although the excellent fit of the simple regressions in Table I is promising for the theory of growth in general-it implies that theories based on easily observable variables may be able to account for most of the cross-country variation in real income it is not supportive of the textbook Solow model in particular.
II. ADDING HUMAN-CAPITAL ACCUMULATION TO THE SOLOW MODEL
Economists have long stressed the importance of human capital to the process of growth. One might expect that ignoring human capital would lead to incorrect conclusions: Kendrick [1976] estimates that over half of the total U. S. capital stock in 1969 was human capital. In this section we explore the effect of adding human-capital accumulation to the Solow growth model.
Including human capital can potentially alter either the theoretical modeling or the empirical analysis of economic growth. At the theoretical level, properly accounting for human capital may change one's view of the nature of the growth process. Lucas [1988] , for example, assumes that although there are decreasing returns to physical-capital accumulation when human capital is held constant, the returns to all reproducible capital (human plus physical) are constant. We discuss this possibility in Section III.
At the empirical level, the existence of human capital can alter the analysis of cross-country differences; in the regressions in Table I human capital is an omitted variable. It is this empirical problem that we pursue in this section. We first expand the Solow model of Section I to include human capital. We show how leaving out human capital affects the coefficients on physical capital investment and population growth. We then run regressions analogous to those in Table I to see whether proxies for human capital can resolve the anomalies found in the first section.7
A. The Model Let the production function be (8) Y(t) = K(t)H(t)P(A(t)L(t))1-a-,
where H is the stock of human capital, and all other variables are defined as before. Let Sk be the fraction of income invested in physical capital and Sh the fraction invested in human capital. The evolution of the economy is determined by
h(t) = Shy(t) -(n + g + 8)h(t),
where y = Y/AL, k = K/AL, and h = H/AL are quantities per effective unit of labor. We are assuming that the same production function applies to human capital, physical capital, and consumption. In other words, one unit of consumption can be transformed costlessly into either one unit of physical capital or one unit of human capital. In addition, we are assuming that human capital depreciates at the same rate as physical capital. Lucas [1988] models the production function for human capital as fundamentally different from that for other goods. We believe that, at least for an initial examination, it is natural to assume that the two types of production functions are similar. We assume that a + ,B < 1, which implies that there are decreasing returns to all capital. (If a + ,B = 1, then there are constant returns to scale in the reproducible factors. In this case, 7. Previous authors have provided evidence of the importance of human capital for growth in income. Azariadis and Drazen [1990] find that no country was able to grow quickly during the postwar period without a highly literate labor force. They interpret this as evidence that there is a threshold externality associated with human capital accumulation. Similarly, Rauch [1988] finds that among countries that had achieved 95 percent adult literacy in 1960, there was a strong tendency for income per capita to converge over the period 1950-1985. Romer [1989b] finds that literacy in 1960 helps explain subsequent investment and that, if one corrects for measurement error, literacy has no impact on growth beyond its effect on investment. There is also older work stressing the role of human capital in development; for example, see Krueger [1968] and Easterlin [1981] .
there is no steady state for this model. We discuss this possibility in Section III.) Equations (9a) and (9b) imply that the economy converges to a steady state defined by \n + g + (10) Like the textbook Solow model, the augmented model predicts coefficients in equation (11) that are functions of the factor shares. As before, a is physical capital's share of income, so we expect a value of a of about one third. Gauging a reasonable value of P, human capital's share, is more difficult. In the United States the minimum wage-roughly the return to labor without human capital-has averaged about 30 to 50 percent of the average wage in manufacturing. This fact suggests that 50 to 70 percent of total labor income represents the return to human capital, or that ,B is between one third and one half. Equation (11) makes two predictions about the regressions run in Section I, in which human capital was ignored. First, even if In (Sh) is independent of the other right-hand side variables, the coefficient on ln(sk) is greater than a/(1 -a). For example, if a = P = 1/3, then the coefficient on ln(sk) would be 1. Because higher saving leads to higher income, it leads to a higher steady-state level of human capital, even if the percentage of income devoted to human-capital accumulation is unchanged. Hence, the presence of human-capital accumulation increases the impact of physicalcapital accumulation on income.
Second, the coefficient on ln(n + g + 8) is larger in absolute value than the coefficient on ln(sk). If a =P = 1/3, for example, the coefficient on ln(n + g + 8) would be -2. In this model high population growth lowers income per capita because the amounts of both physical and human capital must be spread more thinly over the population. There is an alternative way to express the role of human capital in determining income in this model. Combining (11) 
B. Data
To implement the model, we restrict our focus to humancapital investment in the form of education-thus ignoring investment in health, among other things. Despite this narrowed focus, measurement of human capital presents great practical difficulties. Most important, a large part of investment in education takes the form of forgone labor earnings on the part of students.8 This problem is difficult to overcome because forgone earnings vary with the level of human-capital investment: a worker with little human capital forgoes a low wage in order to accumulate more human capital, whereas a worker with much human capital forgoes a higher wage. In addition, explicit spending on education takes place at all levels of government as well as by the family, which makes spending on education hard to measure. Finally, not all spending on education is intended to yield productive human capital: philosophy, religion, and literature, for example, although serving in part to train the mind, might also be a form of consumption.9
We use a proxy for the rate of human-capital accumulation (Sh) that measures approximately the percentage of the working-age population that is in secondary school. We begin with data on the fraction of the eligible population (aged 12 to 17) enrolled in secondary school, which we obtained from the UNESCO yearbook. We then multiply this enrollment rate by the fraction of the working-age population that is of school age (aged 15 to 19). This variable, which we call SCHOOL, is clearly imperfect: the age ranges in the two data series are not exactly the same, the variable does not include the input of teachers, and it completely ignores primary and higher education. Yet if SCHOOL is proportional to Sh, then we can use it to estimate equation (11); the factor of proportionality will affect only the constant term.10
This measure indicates that investment in physical capital and population growth may be proxying for human-capital accumulation in the regressions in Table I -1 and B-2) .
9. An additional problem with implementing the augmented model is that "output" in the model is not the same as that measured in the national income accounts. Much of the expenditure on human capital is forgone wages, and these forgone wages should be included in Y. Yet measured GDP fails to include this component of investment spending.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that this problem is not quantitatively important, however. If human capital accumulation is completely unmeasured, then measured GDP is (1 -Sh)y. One can show that this measurement problem does not affect the elasticity of GDP with respect to physical investment or population growth. The elasticity of measured GDP with respect to human capital accumulation is reduced by Shl(l -Sh) compared with the elasticity of true GDP with respect to human capital accumulation. Because the fraction of a nation's resources devoted to human capital accumulation is small, this effect is small. For example, if a = P = 1/3 and Sh = 0.1, then the elasticity will be 0.9 rather than 1.0. 10. Even under the weaker assumption that ln(sh) is linear in In (SCHOOL), we can use the estimated coefficients on ln(sk) and In (n + g + 5) to infer values of a and P; in this case, the estimated coefficient on In (SCHOOL) will not have an interpretation. and I/GDP is 0.59 for the intermediate sample, and the correlation between SCHOOL and the population growth rate is -0.38. Thus, including human-capital accumulation could alter substantially the estimated impact of physical-capital accumulation and population growth on income per capita.
C. Results
Table II presents regressions of the log of income per capita on the log of the investment rate, the log of n + g + 8, and the log of the percentage of the population in secondary school. The humancapital measure enters significantly in all three samples. It also 
III. ENDOGENOUS GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE
Over the past few years economists studying growth have turned increasingly to endogenous-growth models. These models are characterized by the assumption of nondecreasing returns to the set of reproducible factors of production. For example, our model with physical and human capital would become an endogenous-growth model if a + ,B = 1. Among the implications of this assumption are that countries that save more grow faster indefinitely and that countries need not converge in income per capita, even if they have the same preferences and technology. 11. As we described in the previous footnote, under the weaker assumption that ln(sh) is linear in In (SCHOOL), estimates of a and , can be inferred from the coefficients on ln(I/GDP) and ln(n + g + 5) in the unrestricted regression. When we do this, we obtain estimates of a and , little different from those reported in Table II. Advocates of endogenous-growth models present them as alternatives to the Solow model and motivate them by an alleged empirical failure of the Solow model to explain cross-country differences. Barro [1989] presents the argument succinctly:
In neoclassical growth models with diminishing returns, such as Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), a country's per capita growth rate tends to be inversely related to its starting level of income per person. Therefore, in the absence of shocks, poor and rich countries would tend to converge in terms of levels of per capita income. However, this convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with the cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates are uncorrelated with the starting level of per capita product.
Our first goal in this section is to reexamine this evidence on convergence to assess whether it contradicts the Solow model. Our second goal is to generalize our previous results. To implement the Solow model, we have been assuming that countries in 1985 were in their steady states (or, more generally, that the deviations from steady state were random). Yet this assumption is questionable. We therefore examine the predictions of the augmented Solow model for behavior out of the steady state.
A. Theory
The Solow model predicts that countries reach different steady states. In Section II we argued that much of the cross-country differences in income per capita can be traced to differing determinants of the steady state in the Solow growth model: accumulation of human and physical capital and population growth. Thus, the Solow model does not predict convergence; it predicts only that income per capita in a given country converges to that country's steady-state value. In other words, the Solow model predicts convergence only after controlling for the determinants of the steady state, a phenomenon that might be called "conditional convergence."
In addition, the Solow model makes quantitative predictions about the speed of convergence to steady state. Let y * be the steady-state level of income per effective worker given by equation (11), and let y(t) be the actual value at time t. Approximating around the steady state, the speed of convergence is given by The model suggests a natural regression to study the rate of convergence. Equation (13) In other words, permanent cross-country differences in the production function would lead to differences in initial incomes uncorrelated with subsequent growth rates and, therefore, would bias the results against finding convergence.
B. Results
We now test the convergence predictions of the Solow model. We report regressions of the change in the log of income per capita over the period 1960 to 1985 on the log of income per capita in 1960, with and without controlling for investment, growth of the working-age population, and school enrollment.
In Table III essentially zero. There is no tendency for poor countries to grow faster on average than rich countries. Table III Table IV adds our measures of the rates of investment and population growth to the right-hand side of the regression. In all three samples the coefficient on the initial level of income is now significantly negative; that is, there is strong evidence of convergence. Moreover, the inclusion of investment and population growth rates improves substantially the fit of the regression. Table  V Table IV (16) imposing the restriction that the coefficients on ln(sk), ln(sh), and ln(n + g + 5) sum to zero. We find that this restriction is not rejected and that imposing it has little effect on the coefficients. The last lines in Table VI Thus, the marginal product of capital varies positively with the population growth rate and negatively with the saving rate. Because the cross-country differences in saving and population growth rates are large, the differences in rates of return should also Although these two facts indeed present puzzles to be resolved, it is premature to view them as a basis for rejecting the Solow model. The Solow model predicts that the marginal product of capital will be high in low-saving countries, but it does not necessarily predict that real interest rates will also be high. One can infer the marginal product of capital from real interest rates on financial assets only if investors are optimizing and capital markets are perfect. Both of these assumptions are questionable. It is 13. There is an alternative way of obtaining the marginal product of capital, which applies even outside of the steady state but requires an estimate of I and the assumption of no country-specific shifts to the production function. If one assumes that the returns on human and physical capital are equalized within each country, then one can show that the MPK is proportional toy(a+P-1)/(a+P). Therefore, for the textbook Solow model in which a = 1/3 and I = 0, the MPK is inversely proportional to the square of output. As King and Rebelo [1989] and others have noted, the implied differences in rates of return across countries are incredibly large. Yet if a = 0 = 1/3, then the MPK is inversely proportional to the square root of output. In this case, the implied cross-country differences in the MPK are much smaller and are similar to those obtained with equation (17).
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possible that some of the most productive investments in poor countries are in public capital, and that the behavior of the governments of poor countries is not socially optimal. In addition, it is possible that the marginal product of private capital is also high in poor countries, yet those economic agents who could make the productive investments do not do so because they face financing constraints or because they fear future expropriation.
Some evidence for this interpretation comes from examining international variation in the rate of profit. If capital earns its marginal product, then one can measure the marginal product of capital as
MPK=Ky
That is, the return to capital equals capital's share in income (a) divided by the capital-output ratio (K/Y). The available evidence indicates that capital's share is roughly constant across counties. Sachs [1979, profit rates were not at least somewhat higher in developing countries.
Further evidence on rates of return comes from the large literature on international differences in the return to education. Psacharopoulos [1985] summarizes the results of studies for over 60 countries that analyze the determinants of labor earnings using micro data. Because forgone wages are the primary cost of education, the rate of return is roughly the percentage increase in the wage resulting from an additional year of schooling. He reports that the poorer the country, the larger the return to schooling.
Overall, the evidence on the return to capital appears consistent with the Solow model. Indeed, one might argue that it supports the Solow model against the alternative of endogenousgrowth models. Many endogenous-growth models assume constant returns to scale in the reproducible factors of production; they therefore imply that the rate of return should not vary with the level of development. Yet direct measurement of profit rates and returns to schooling indicates that the rate of return is much higher in poor countries.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that international differences in income per capita are best understood using an augmented Solow growth model. In this model output is produced from physical capital, human capital, and labor, and is used for investment in physical capital, investment in human capital, and consumption. One production function that is consistent with our empirical results is Y= K1/3H1"31/3. This model of economic growth has several implications. First, the elasticity of income with respect to the stock of physical capital is not substantially different from capital's share in income. This conclusion indicates, in contrast to Romer's suggestion, that capital receives approximately its social return. In other words, there are not substantial externalities to the accumulation of physical capital.
Second, despite the absence of externalities, the accumulation of physical capital has a larger impact on income per capita than the textbook Solow model implies. A higher saving rate leads to higher income in steady state, which in turn leads to a higher level of human capital, even if the rate of human-capital accumulation is unchanged. Higher saving thus raises total factor productivity as it is usually measured. This difference between the textbook model and the augmented model is quantitatively important. The textbook Solow model with a capital share of one third indicates that the elasticity of income with respect to the saving rate is one half. Our augmented Solow model indicates that this elasticity is one.
Third, population growth also has a larger impact on income per capita than the textbook model indicates. In the textbook model higher population growth lowers income because the available capital must be spread more thinly over the population of workers. In the augmented model human capital also must be spread more thinly, implying that higher population growth lowers measured total factor productivity. Again, this effect is important quantitatively. In the textbook model with a capital share of one third, the elasticity of income per capita with respect to n + g + 8 is -'/2. In our augmented model this elasticity is -2. Fourth, our model has implications for the dynamics of the economy when the economy is not in steady state. In contrast to endogenous-growth models, this model predicts that countries with similar technologies and rates of accumulation and population growth should converge in income per capita. Yet this convergence occurs more slowly than the textbook Solow model suggests. The textbook Solow model implies that the economy reaches halfway to steady state in about 17 years, whereas our augmented Solow model implies that the economy reaches halfway in about 35 years.
More generally, our results indicate that the Solow model is consistent with the international evidence if one acknowledges the importance of human as well as physical capital. The augmented Solow model says that differences in saving, education, and population growth should explain cross-country differences in income per capita. Our examination of the data indicates that these three variables do explain most of the international variation.
Future research should be directed at explaining why the variables taken to be exogenous in the Solow model vary so much from country to country. We expect that differences in tax policies, education policies, tastes for children, and political stability will end up among the ultimate determinants of cross-country differences. We also expect that the Solow model will provide the best framework for understanding how these determinants influence a country's level of economic well-being.
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